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The objectives of this paper are : ﬁrst, to quantify the stabilization welfare gains from
commitment; second, to examine how commitment to an optimal rule can be sustained
as an equilibrium and third, to ﬁnd a simple interest rate rule that closely approxi-
mates the optimal commitment one. We utilize an inﬂuential empirical micro-founded
DSGE model, the euro area model of Smets and Wouters (2003), and a quadratic
approximation of the representative household’s utility as the welfare criterion. Im-
portantly, we impose the eﬀect of a nominal interest rate zero lower bound. In contrast
with previous studies, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant stabilization gains from commitment: our
central estimate is a 0.4 − 0.5% equivalent permanent increase in consumption, but
in a variant with a higher degree of price stickiness, gains of over 2% are found. We
also ﬁnd that a simple optimized commitment rule with the nominal interest rate re-
sponding to current inﬂation and the real wage closely mimics the optimal rule.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E37, E58
Keywords: Monetary rules, commitment, discretion, welfare gains.
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This paper has three principle objectives. First, to quantify the stabilization gains from 
commitment in terms of household welfare. Second, to examine how commitment to an 
optimal or approximately optimal rule can be sustained as an equilibrium in which reneging 
hardly ever occurs. And finally, to find a simple interest rate rule that closely approximates 
the optimal commitment (and complex) rule.  
 
We utilize an influential empirical micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model of the euro area in which there are four sources of time-inconsistency: from 
forward-looking pricing, consumption, investment and wage setting. In the absence of 
commitment, following a shock which diverts the economy from its steady state and given 
expectations of inflation, the opportunist policy-maker can increase or decrease output by 
reducing or increasing the interest rate which increases or decreases inflation. This results in a 
higher variability of inflation and the nominal interest rate under discretion. The latter means 
that the interest rate zero lower bound constraint is tighter under discretion and its presence 
increases the stabilization gains from commitment. The constraint can be relaxed by 
increasing the steady state inflation rate, but at a cost of an increase in the deterministic 
component of the welfare loss.  
 
In terms of methodology our welfare-based loss function uses the ‘small distortions’ quadratic 
approximation to the consumer’s utility which is accurate if the steady state is close to the 
social optimum. In assessing this condition we highlight a neglected aspect of typical New 
Keynesian models: external habit in consumption tends to make labour supply and the natural 
rate of output too high compared with the social optimum. If the habit effect is sufficiently 
high and labour market and product market distortions are not too big then, with a sufficiently 
small tax wedge, the natural rate can actually be above the social optimum. This would then 
render the long-run ‘inflationary bias’ negative.  
 
Whilst the validity of an inflationary bias arising from the pursuit of an ambitious output 
target above its natural rate has been criticized, our analysis suggests a rather different form of 
bias arising from the interest rate zero lower bound. We find that the optimal steady state 
inflation rate necessary to avoid the lower bound is far lower under commitment than under 
discretion, so there is a new sense in which there is a long-run inflationary bias which is really 
an integral part of the stabilization bias.  
 
Our exercises, suggest that the stabilization gains from commitment rise considerably if the 
lower bound effect is taken into account. Using empirical estimates from the core model and 
the preferred variant of the model without indexation, we find an average consumption and 
inflation-equivalent gains of gain 0.4-0.5% and 0.6-0.7% respectively, the latter on a quarterly 
basis. For the variant of the model with lower price stickiness, these rise considerably. 
 
Given these large gains from commitment, the incentive for central banks to avoid a loss of 
reputation for commitment is substantial. Consequently, unless the policymaker is 
implausibly myopic, a commitment rule can be sustained as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in 
which deviation from commitment hardly ever happens despite the possibility of large 
exogenous shocks.  
 
Finally, we find that simple interest rate rules should respond to labour-market conditions as 
well as inflation. The optimal commitment rule can be closely approximated in terms of its 
good stabilization properties by an interest rate rule that responds positively to current 
inflation and to the current real wage.  
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Following the pioneering contributions of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983), the credibility problem associated with monetary policy has stimulated a
huge academic literature that has been inﬂuential with policymakers. The central mes-
sage underlying these contributions is the existence of signiﬁcant macroeconomic gains, in
some sense, from ‘enhancing credibility’ through formal commitment to a policy rule or
through institutional arrangements for central banks such as independence, transparency,
and forward-looking inﬂation targets, that achieve the same outcome.
In the essentially static model used in those seminal papers and in much of the huge
literature they inspired, the loss associated with a lack of credibility takes the form of a
long-run inﬂationary bias. For a dynamic models of the New Keynesian genre, such as
the DSGE euro area model employed in this paper, the inﬂuential review of Clarida et al.
(1999) emphasizes the stabilization gains from commitment which exist whether or not
there is a long-run inﬂationary bias. But what are the size of these stabilization gains
from commitment? If they are small then the credibility problem is solely concerned with
the credibility of long-run low inﬂation.
The ﬁrst objective of the paper is to quantify the stabilization gains from commit-
ment in terms of household welfare. Previous work has addressed this question (see, for
example, Currie and Levine (1993), Vestin (2001), Ehrmann and Smets (2003), McCal-
lum and Nelson (2004), Dieppe et al. (2005) and Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2006)), but
only in the context of econometric models without micro-foundations and using an ad
hoc loss function, or both, or for rudimentary New Keynesian models. The credibility
issue only arises because the decisions of consumers and ﬁrms are forward looking and
depends on expectations of future policy. In the earlier generation of econometric models
lacking micro-foundations, many aspects of such forward-looking behaviour were lacking
and therefore important sources of time-inconsistency were missing. Although for simple
New Keynesian models a quadratic approximation of the representative consumer’s utility
coincides with the standard ad hoc loss that penalizes variances of the output gap and
inﬂation, in more developed DSGE models this is far from the case. By utilizing an inﬂu-
ential empirical micro-founded DSGE model, the euro area model of Smets and Wouters
(2003), and using a quadratic approximation of the representative household’s utility as
the welfare criterion, we remedy these deﬁciencies of earlier estimates of commitment
gains.
An further important consideration when addressing the gains from commitment, and
missing from these earlier studies, is the existence of a nominal interest rate zero lower
6
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(for example, Coenen and Wieland (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Woodford
(2003), chapter 6). In an important contribution to the credibility literature, Adam and
Billi (2006) show that ignoring the zero lower bound constraint for the setting of the
nominal interest rate can result in considerably underestimating the stabilization gain
from commitment. The reason for this is that under discretion the monetary authority
cannot make credible promises about future policy. For a given setting of future interest
rates the volatility of inﬂation is driven up by the expectations of the private sector that
the monetary authority will re-optimize in the future. This means that to achieve a given
low volatility of inﬂation the lower bound is reached more often under discretion than
under commitment. These authors study a simple New Keynesaian model and are able to
employ non-linear techniques. Since we employ a more developed model, we choose a more
tractable linear-quadratic (LQ) framework.1 We follow Woodford (2003) in approximating
the eﬀects of a zero interest rate lower bound by imposing the requirement that the interest
rate volatility in a commitment are discretionary equilibria are small enough to ensure that
the violations of the zero lower bound are very infrequent.
Our second objective is to examine how commitment to an optimal or approximately
optimal rule can be sustained as an ‘reputational’ equilibrium in which reneging hardly
ever occurs. We extend the incomplete information2 of Barro (1986) to a stochastic setting
and to a model with structural dynamics. Our ﬁnal objective is to search for a simple
interest rate rule that closely approximates the optimal commitment (and complex) rule.
This particular part of the paper closely follows Levin et al. (2006) but unlike these authors
incorporates a interest rate lower bound into the design of the rule.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins by using a simple
New Keynesian model to show analytically how a stabilization bias arises in models with
structural dynamics. It goes on to generalize the treatment to any linear DSGE model
with a quadratic loss function and also to take into account the interest rate lower bound.
1A LQ framework is convenient for a number of reasons: it allows closed-form expressions for the wel-
fare loss under optimal commitment, discretion and simple commitment rules that enable us to study the
incentives to renege on commitment. Bayesian estimation methods use a linearized form of the dynamic
model. A linear framework further allows us to characterize saddle-path stability and the possible inde-
terminacy of simple rules. Last but not least, the implementation of the numerical methods utilized by
Adam and Billi (2006) for a simple New Keynesian model with only 2 state variables would fall foul of the
“curse of dimensionality” (Judd (1998), chapter 7) in our model with 11 state variables.
2This avoids well-established problems of trigger strategies use in Barro and Gordon (1983)–see al-
Nowaihi and Levine (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994).




Working Paper Series No 709
January 2007We derive closed-form expressions for welfare under optimal commitment, discretion and
simple commitment rules and use these to derive a ‘no-deviation condition’ for commitment
to exist as an equilibrium in which reneging on commitment takes place very infrequently.
Section 3 sets out a version of the Smets-Wouters model (henceforth SW) with one
additional feature: the addition of a tax wedge in the steady state. A linearization of the
model about a zero-interest steady state and a quadratic approximation of the represen-
tative household’s utility (provided in section 5) sets up the optimization problem facing
the monetary authority in the required LQ framework. Section 4 estimates the SW model
and variants where the indexing of prices and/or wages is suppressed, and a price contract
of 4 quarters is imposed.
Our welfare quadratic approximations assumes that the zero-inﬂation steady state is
close to the social optimum (the ‘small distortions case’ of Woodford (2003)). In section 5
we therefore assess the quality of this approximation. In doing this we examine a relatively
neglected aspect of New Keynesian models that arises with the inclusion of external habit
in consumption, namely that the natural rate of output and employment can actually be
above the social optimum making the inﬂationary bias negative and the tax wedge, up to a
point, welfare-enhancing. In section 6 we address the three central questions in the paper:
how big are stabilization gains, how can the fully optimal commitment rule be sustained
as an equilibrium given the time-inconsistency problem and can a simple rule mimic the
optimal commitment rule? Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Time Inconsistency Problem
2.1 The Stabilization Bias in Two Simple DSGE Models
We ﬁrst demonstrate how a stabilization bias in addition to the better known long-run
inﬂationary bias can arise using two simple and now very standard DSGE models. The
ﬁrst popularized notably by Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003) is ‘New Keynesian’
and takes the form.
πt = βEtπt+1 + λyt + ut (1)
yt = Etyt+1 −
1
σ
(rt − Etπt+1) (2)
In (1) and (2), πt is the inﬂation rate, β is the private sector’s discount factor, Et( )
is the expectations operator and yt is output measured relative to its ﬂexi-price value,
the ‘output gap’, which equals consumption measured relative to its ﬂexi-price value in
this closed-economy model without capital or government spending. (1) is derived as a
linearized form of Calvo staggered price setting about a zero-inﬂation steady state and (2)
8
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ut is a zero-mean shock to marginal costs. All variables are expressed as deviations about
the steady state, πt and rt as absolute deviations, and yt as a proportional deviation.
The second model simply replaces (1) with a ‘New Classical Phillips Curve’ (see Wood-
ford (2003), chapter 3):
πt = Et−1πt + λyt + ut (3)
This aggregate supply curve can be derived by assuming some ﬁrms ﬁx prices one period
in advance and others can adjust immediately.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) employed the ‘New Clas-
sical Phillips Curve’ (3) and showed that a time-inconsistency or credibility problem in
monetary policy arises when the monetary authority at time 0 sets a state-contingent












Having set the inﬂation rule, the Euler equation (2) then determines the nominal interest
rate that will put the economy on a path with the implied interest rate trajectory. The
constant k in the loss function arises because the steady state is ineﬃcient owing to
imperfect competition and other distortions. For this simple, essentially static model of
the economy (it is really SGE rather than DSGE), optimal rules must take the form of a
constant deterministic component plus a stochastic shock-contingent component. These
rules depend on whether the policymaker can commit, or she exercises discretion and










wy + λ2ut = πD(ut) (6)
Thus the optimal inﬂation rule with commitment, πC(ut) consists of zero average inﬂa-
tion plus a shock-contingent component which sees inﬂation raised (i.e., monetary policy
relaxed) in the face of a negative supply shock. The discretionary policy, πD(ut), can
be implemented as a rule with the same shock-continent component as the ex ante op-
timal rule. The only diﬀerence is now that it includes a non-zero average inﬂation or
inﬂationary bias equal to
wyk
λ which renders the rule time-consistent. The credibility
or ‘time-inconsistency’ problem, ﬁrst raised by Kydland and Prescott, was simply how to
eliminate the inﬂationary bias whilst retaining the ﬂexibility to deal with exogenous shocks.
9
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economy characterized by the New Classical Philips Curve. This is not the case when
we move to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, (1). Then using general optimization
procedures described below in section 2.2.2 and in Appendix A, (5) and (6) now become
πC
t = πC
t (ut,ut−1) = δπC














2bβ .4 Comparing these two sets of results we see that the discretionary
rule is unchanged, but the commitment rule now is a rule responding to past shocks (i.e.,
is a rule with memory) and therefore the stabilization component of the commitment rules
now diﬀers from that of the discretionary rule. Since the commitment rule is the ex ante
optimal policy it follows that there are also now stabilization gains from commitment. The
time-inconsistency problem facing the monetary authority in a New Keynesian economic
environment now becomes the elimination of the inﬂationary bias whilst retaining the
ﬂexibility to deal with exogenous shocks in an optimal way.
2.2 The Stabilization Bias in General DSGE Models
The stabilization bias arose in our simple DSGE model by replacing a Phillips Curve
based on one-period ahead price contracts with one based on staggered Calvo-type price
setting. In the DSGE model of the euro area presented in the next section there are a
number of additional mechanisms that create price, wage and output persistence. The
model also incorporates capital accumulation. All these features add structural dynamics
to the model and these, together will forward-looking behaviour involving consumption,
investment, price-setting and wage- setting add further sources of stabilization gains from
commitment.

















where zt is a (n − m) × 1 vector of predetermined variables at time t with z0 given, xt, is
a m×1 vector of non-predetermined variables and ot is a vector of outputs. All variables
are expressed as absolute or proportional deviations about a steady state. A, C and A are
4See also Clarida et al. (1999)
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formed assuming an information set {zs,xs,ǫs}, s ≤ t, the model and the monetary rule.
The linearized euro-area model set out in the next section can be expressed in this form
where zt consists of exogenous shocks, lags in non-predetermined and output variables
and capital stock; xt consists of current inﬂation, the real wage, investment, Tobin’s Q,
consumption and ﬂexi-price outcomes for the latter two variables, and outputs ot consist
of marginal costs, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure,
the cost of capital, labour supply, output, ﬂexi-price outcomes, the output gap and other
target variables for the monetary authority. Let st = M[zT
t xT
t ]T be the vector of such
target variables. For both ad hoc and welfare-based loss function discussed below, the









where the single-period loss function is given by Lt = sT
t Q1st = yT
t Qyt where yt = [zT
t xT
t ]T
and Q = MTQ1M.
2.2.1 Imposing an Interest Rate Zero Lower Bound Constraint
In the absence of a lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate the policymaker’s
optimization problem is to minimize (11) subject to (9) and (10). If the variances of
shocks are suﬃciently large, this will lead to a large nominal interest rate variability and
the possibility of the nominal interest rate becoming negative. To rule out this possibility
and to remain within the convenient LQ framework of this paper we follow Woodford
(2003), chapter 6, and approximate the interest rate lower bound eﬀect by introducing



























Then Woodford shows that the eﬀect of these extra constraints is to follow the same
optimization as before except that the single period loss function is replaced with
Lt = yT
t Qyt + wr(rt − r∗)2 (14)
where wr > 0 if (13) binds (which we assume) and r∗ is a nominal interest rate target. We
linearize around a zero-inﬂation deterministic steady state with rt an absolute deviation
11
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r∗ > 0 if monetary transactions frictions are negligible, but r∗ < 0 is possible otherwise.
In what follows we consider a model with no monetary transactions frictions, so r∗ > 0 is
appropriate. The policymaker’s optimization problem is now to choose an unconditional
distribution for rt (i.e., the steady state variance) shifted to the right about a new non-zero
steady state inﬂation rate, such that the probability of the interest rate hitting the lower
bound is very low. As we demonstrate below in section 6.2, this is achieved by an optimal
combination of a suﬃciently small unconditional variance and the choice of the new steady
state inﬂation rate.
2.2.2 Commitment Versus Discretion
To derive the ex ante optimal policy with commitment following Currie and Levine (1993)








t Qyt + wrr2




with respect to {rt}, {yt} and the row vector of costate variables, pt, given z0. From
























is partitioned so that p1t, the co-state vector associated with the predetermined variables, is
of dimension (n−m)×1 and p2t, the co-state vector associated with the non-predetermined
variables, is of dimension m × 1. The (conditional) loss function is given by
ΩOP













where Zt = ztzT
















5Optimality from a ‘timeless perspective’ imposes a diﬀerent condition at time t = 0 (see Appendix
A.1.2), but this has no bearing on the stochastic component of policy.
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are partitioned conformably with yt = [zT
t xT
t ]T so that S11 for instance has dimensions
(n − m) × (n − m).
Note that in order to achieve optimality the policy-maker sets p20 = 0 at time t = 0.
At time t > 0 there exists a gain from reneging by resetting p2t = 0. It can be shown
that matrices N11 and N22 are negative deﬁnite, so the the loss in (18) is positive and
an incentive to renege exists at all points along the trajectory of the optimal policy by
resetting p2t = 0. This essentially is the time-inconsistency problem facing stabilization
policy in a model with structural dynamics.









= (1 − β)(yT
t Qyt + wrr2
t) + βΩt+1 (20)
The dynamic programming solution then seeks a stationary solution of the form rt =
−Fzt, Ωt = zTSz and x = −Nz where matrices S and N are diﬀerent matrices from
those under commitment (unless there is no forward-looking behviour), now of dimensions
(n−m)×(n−m) and m×(n−m) respectively. The value function Ωt is minimized at time t,
subject to (9) and (10), in the knowledge that a similar procedure will be used to minimize
Ωt+1 at time t + 1.6 Both the instrument rt and the forward-looking variables xt are now
proportional to the predetermined component of the state-vector zt and the equilibrium
we seek is therefore Markov Perfect. In Appendix A we set out an iterative process for Ft,
Nt, and St starting with some initial values. If the process converges to stationary values
independent of these initial values,7 F, N and S say, then the time-consistent feedback
rule is rt = −Fzt with loss at time t given by
ΩTC










2.2.3 Simple Commitment Rules
We now address a problem with the optimal commitment rule: that in all but very simple
models it is extremely complex, with the interest rate feeding back at time t on the full
state vector zt and all past realizations of zt back to the initiation of the rule at t = 0.8
We therefore seek to mimic the optimal commitment rule with simpler rules of the form






6See Currie and Levine (1993) and S¨ oderlind (1999).
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the loss at time t is given by
ΩSIM










where V = V (D) satisﬁes a Lyapanov equation. ΩSIM
t can now be minimized with respect
to D to give an optimized simple rule of the form (22) with D = D∗. A very important
feature of optimized simple rules is that unlike their optimal commitment or optimal
discretionary counterparts they are not certainty equivalent. In fact if the rule is designed






and so depends on the displacement z0 at
time t = 0 and on the covariance matrix of innovations Σ = cov(ǫt). From non-certainty
equivalence it follows that if the simple rule were to be re-designed at ant time t > 0, since
the re-optimized D∗ will then depend on Zt the new rule will diﬀer from that at t = 0.
This feature is true in models with or without rational forward-looking behaviour and it
implies that simple rules are time-inconsistent even in non-RE models.
2.3 Sustaining the Commitment Outcome as An Equilibrium
Suppose that there are two types of monetary policymaker, a ‘strong’ type who likes to
commit and perceives substantial costs from reneging on any such commitment, and a
‘weak’ type who optimizes in an opportunistic fashion on a period-by-period basis. The
‘strong type’ could be a policymaker with a modiﬁed loss function as in Rogoﬀ (1985),
Walsh (1995), Svensson and Woodford (2005), though for the case of Rogoﬀ-delegation the
outcome is second-best. In a complete information setting, these types would be observed
by the public and the strong type would pursue the optimal commitment monetary rule
or a simple approximation, and the weak type would pursue the discretionary policy. We
assume there is uncertainty about the type of policymaker and the weak type is trying to
build a reputation for commitment. The game is now one of incomplete information and
we examine the possibility that commitment rules can be sustained as a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium.
Consider the following strategy proﬁle.
1. A strong type follows an optimal or simple commitment rule.
2. In period t a weak type acts as strong and follows the commitment rule with prob-
ability 1 − qt, if it has acted strong (qt = 0) in all previous periods. Otherwise it
pursues the discretionary rule and reveals its type.
3. Let ρt be the probability assigned by the private sector to the event that the pol-
icymaker is of the strong type. We can regard ρt as a measure of reputation. At
14
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private sector receives the ‘signal’ consisting of the inﬂation set by the policymaker.
At the end of the period it updates the probability ρt, using Bayes rule, and then
forms expectations of the next period’s inﬂation rate.
In principle there are three types of equilibria to these games. If both strong and weak
governments send the same message (i.e. implement the same interest rate) we have a
pooling equilibrium. If they send diﬀerent messages this gives a separating equilibrium. If
one or more players randomizes with a mixed strategy we have a hybrid equilibrium. Thus
in the above game, qt = 0 gives a pooling equilibrium, qt = 1 a separating equilibrium and
0 < qt < 1 a hybrid equilibrium. If qt = 0 is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to this game,
then we have solved the time-inconsistency problem.
To show that qt = 0, it is suﬃcient to show that, given beliefs by the private sector,
there is no incentive for a weak government to ever deviate from acting strong. To show this
we must compare the welfare if the policymaker continues with the optimal commitment
policy at time t with that if it reneges, re-optimizes and then suﬀers a loss of reputation.
Consider the optimal commitment rule ﬁrst. At time t the single period loss function
is L(zt,p2t) and the intertemporal loss function can be written
ΩOP




t+1,p2,t+1) is given by (17). If the policymaker re-optimizes at time t the corre-
sponding loss is
ΩR
t (zt,0) = (1 − β)L(zt,0) + βΩTC
t+1(zR
t+1) (25)
where from (17) we now have that zR
t+1 = H11zt.
The condition for a perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium is that for all realizations of
shocks to (zt,p2t) at every time t the no-deviation condition
ΩOP
t (zt,p2t) < ΩR
t (zt,0) (26)
holds. If this condition holds, then the weak authority always mimics the strong author-
ity and follows the commitment rule thus sustaining average zero inﬂation coupled with
optimal stabilization.
Using (24), (31), (18) and (21) the no-deviation condition (26) can be written as










tr((S + N11)Σ) (27)
15
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putting p2t = 0. The second term on the left-hand-side of (27) are the possible one-oﬀ
stabilization gains since the state of the economy after reneging reﬂected in zR
t+1 will be
closer to the long-run than that along the commitment policy reﬂected in zOP
t+1,p2t+1. These
two terms together constitute the temptation to renege. Since tr((S+N11) > 0, the right-
hand-side is always positive and constitutes the penalty in the shape of the stabilization
loss when dealing with future shocks following a loss of reputation.
If the time-period is small (i.e. β ≃ 1), then the single-period gains are also relatively
small and we can treat the loss of reputation as if it were instantaneous. Then the no




for all realizations of exogenous stochastic shocks. From (18) and (21) this becomes





Note that both −N22 and (N11 + S) are positive deﬁnite (see Currie and Levine (1993),
chapter 5 for a continuous-time analysis on which the discrete-time analysis here is based).
It follows that both the right-hand-side and the left-hand side are positive, so (29) is not
automatically satisﬁed.9 Finally we consider the no-deviation condition for a simple rule.
Consider the optimized rule set at t = 0 which we take to be the steady state. Then
Z0 = 0 and D∗ = D∗(Σ). If the policymaker continues with this policy then in state zt at
time t the welfare loss is given by
ΩSIM




t+1 = H(D∗)zt and H is given in Appendix A. If the policy deviates she goes to a
re-optimized reneging rule DR = DR((Zt +
β
1−βΣ)) which now depends on the realization
of zt at Time t. The welfare loss is then
ΩR




t+1 = H(DR)zt. Proceeding as before the no-deviation condition now becomes
L(zt,D∗) − L(zt,DR) − βEt
 
tr(SZR






tr((S − V )Σ) (32)
9The analysis of this section assumes that the steady state is the same under commitment and discretion.
When the interest rate lower bound constraint is introduced this is no longer the case. Let the new steady-




TC respectively and the increase in the steady
state welfare loss arising from an positive inﬂation rate be W(π
∗). Then a term
W((π∗)TC)−W((π∗)OP )
1−β is
added to the left-hand-side of (27) and (29).
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deviation conditions (27), (29) and (32), since Zt or p2t are unbounded stochastic variables
there will inevitably be some realizations for which they are not satisﬁed. In other words
the Bayesian equilibrium must be of the mixed-strategy type with qt > 0. What we
must now show that qt is very small so we will only experience very occasional losses of
reputation. This we examine in section 6.6.
3 The Model
3.1 The Smets-Wouters Model
The Smets-Wouters (SW) model in an extended version of the standard New-Keynesian
DSGE closed-economy model with sticky prices and wages estimated by Bayesian tech-
niques. The model features three types of agents: households, ﬁrms and the monetary
policy authority. Households maximize a utility function with two arguments (goods and
leisure) over an inﬁnite horizon. Consumption appears in the utility function relative to a
time-varying external habit-formation variable. Labour is diﬀerentiated over households,
so that there is some monopoly power over wages, which results in an explicit wage equa-
tion and allows for the introduction of sticky nominal Calvo-type wages contracts (Calvo
(1983)). Households also rent capital services to ﬁrms and decide how much capital to
accumulate given certain capital adjustment costs. Firms produce diﬀerentiated goods,
decide on labour and capital inputs, and set Calvo-type price contracts. Wage and price
setting is augmented by the assumption that those prices and wages that can not be freely
set are partially indexed to past inﬂation. Prices are therefore set as a function of current
and expected real marginal cost, but are also inﬂuenced by past inﬂation. Real marginal
cost depends on wages and the rental rate of capital. The short-term nominal interest
rate is the instrument of monetary policy. The stochastic behaviour of the model is driven
by ten exogenous shocks: ﬁve shocks arising from technology and preferences, three cost-
push shocks and two monetary-policy shocks. Consistent with the DSGE set up, potential
output is deﬁned as the level of output that would prevail under ﬂexible prices and wages
in the absence of cost-push shocks.
We incorporate one important modiﬁcation to the SW model: the addition of distor-
tionary taxes at the steady state. As we will see this has a bearing on the ineﬃciency at
the steady state, the quadratic approximation of the utility function used for the welfare
analysis and the existence of an inﬂationary bias.
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where Et is the expectations operator indicating expectations formed at time t, β is the
household’s discount factor, UC,t, UM,t and UL,t are preference shocks common to all
households, Ct(r) is an index of consumption, Lt(r) are hours worked, HC,t represents
the habit in consumption, or desire not to diﬀer too much from other households, and
we choose HC,t = hCt−1, where Ct = 1
ν
 ν
r=1 Ct(r) is the average consumption index,
h ∈ [0,1). When h = 0, σ > 1 is the risk aversion parameter (or the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution) Mt(r) are end-of-period nominal money balances
and u(Gt) is the utility from exogenous real government spending Gt. We normalize the
household number ν to unity.
The representative household r must obey a budget constraint:
(1+TC,t)Pt(Ct(r)+I(r))+Et[Dt+1Bt+1(r)]+Mt(r) = (1−TY,t)PtYt(r)+Bt(r)+Mt−1(r)+TRt
(34)
where Pt is the GDP price index and It(r) is investment. Assuming complete ﬁnancial
markets, Bt+1(r) is a random variable denoting the payoﬀ of the portfolio Bt(r), purchased
at time t, and Dt+1 is the stochastic discount factor over the interval [t,t + 1] that pays
one unit of currency in a particular state of period t + 1 divided by the probability of
an occurrence of that state given information available in period t. The nominal rate of
return on bonds (the nominal interest rate), Rt, is then given by the relation Et[Dt+1] =
1
1+Rt. The tax structure is as follows: TRt are lump-sum transfers to households by the
government net of lump-sum taxes, TC,t and TY,t are consumption and income tax rates
respectively. The income tax rate is paid on total income, PtYt(r), given by
PtYt(r) = Wt(r)Lt(r) + (RK,tZt(r) − Ψ(Zt(r))PtKt−1(r) + Γt(r) (35)
where Wt(r) is the wage rate, RK,t is the real return on beginning-of period t capital stock,
Kt−1, owned by households, Zt(r) ∈ [0,1] is the degree of capital utilization with costs
PtΨ(Zt(r))Kt−1(r) where Ψ′, Ψ′′ > 0, and Γt(r) is income from dividends derived from the
imperfectly competitive intermediate ﬁrms plus the net cash inﬂow from state-contingent
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Kt(r) = (1 − δ)Kt−1(r) + (1 − S (Xt(r)))It(r) (36)
where Xt(r) =
UI,tIt(r)
It−1(r) , UI,t is a shock to investment costs and we assume the investment
adjustment cost function, S( ), has the properties S(1) = S′(1) = 0.
As set below, intermediate ﬁrms employ diﬀerentiated labour with a constant CES









   1
0 Wt(r)1−ηdr
  1
1−η is an average wage index and Lt =







Household r chooses {Ct(r)}, {Mt(r)}, {Kt(r)}, {Z(r)} and {Lt(r)} (or {Wt(r)}) to
maximize (33) subject to (34)–(37), taking external habit HC,t, RK,t and prices and as
given. The insurance provided by state-contingency securities (the complete ﬁnancial
markets assumption) enables us to impose symmetry on households (so that Ct(r) =
Ct, etc). Then by the standard Lagrangian method we have the ﬁrst-order necessary
conditions:







































+ RK,t+1Zt − Ψ(Zt+1))
 
(40)

































t (Ct − HC,t)σ (43)
where MUC
t and MUL
t are the marginal utilities of consumption and work respectively.
(38) is the familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule adapted to take into account habit in consumption.
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habit and negatively on the nominal interest rate. Given the central bank’s setting of
the latter, (39) is completely recursive to the rest of the system describing our macro-
model. In (40) and (41), Qt is the real value of capital (Tobin’s Q) and these conditions
describe optimal investment behaviour. (42) describes optimal capacity utilization and
(43) equates the real disposable wage with the marginal rate of substitution (MRSt)
between consumption and leisure and reﬂects the market power of households arising
from their monopolistic supply of a diﬀerentiated factor input with elasticity η.
3.3 Firms
Competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms use a continuum of intermediate goods according to a con-
stant returns CES technology to produce aggregate output
Yt =





where ζ is the elasticity of substitution. This implies a set of demand equations for each








   1
0 Pt(f)1−ζdf
  1
1−ζ. Pt is an aggregate intermediate price index, but since
ﬁnal goods ﬁrms are competitive and the only inputs are intermediate goods, it is also the
GDP price level.
In the intermediate goods sector each good f is produced by a single ﬁrm f using
diﬀerentiated labour and capital with a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt(f) = At(Zt(f)Kt−1(f))αLt(f)1−α − F (46)
where F are ﬁxed costs of production and
Lt(f) =





is an index of diﬀerentiated labour types used by the ﬁrm, where Lt(r,f) is the labour input
of type r by ﬁrm f, and At is an exogenous shock capturing shifts to trend total factor
productivity (TFP) in this sector. The cost of labour to the ﬁrm is (1+TL,t)Wt where TL,t
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January 2007Then aggregating over ﬁrms and denoting
  1
0 Lt(r,f)df = Lt(r) leads to the demand for
labour as shown in (37). In an equilibrium of equal households and ﬁrms, all wages adjust
to the same level Wt and it follows that Yt = At(ZtKt−1)αL1−α
t . For later analysis we









α−α(1 − α)−(1−α) (49)
Turning to price-setting, we assume there is a probability of 1 − ξp at each period
that the price of each good f is set optimally to P0
t (f). If the price is not re-optimized,
then it is indexed to last period’s aggregate producer price inﬂation.10 With indexation














,... . For each producer ﬁrm f the objective is
at time t to choose P0
















where Dt+k is the stochastic discount factor over the interval [t,t+k], subject to a common





























+ (1 − ξp)(P0
t+1(f))1−ζ (52)
3.4 Staggered Wage-Setting
We introduce wage stickiness in an analogous way. There is a probability 1 − ξw that the
wage rate of a household of type r is set optimally at W0
t (r). If the wage is not re-optimized
then it is indexed to last period’s GDP inﬂation. With a wage indexation parameter γw,














,     . The household of type r at time t then chooses W0


















10Thus we can interpret
1
1−ξp as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.
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MUC
t (r)
Pt is the real marginal utility of consumption income and Lt(r) is


























Note that as ξw → 0 and wages become perfectly ﬂexible, only the ﬁrst term in the
summation in (53) counts and we then have the result (43) obtained previously. By










+ (1 − ξw)(W0
t+1(r))1−η (55)
3.5 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, goods markets, money markets and the bond market all clear. Equating
the supply and demand of the consumer good we obtain
Yt = At(ZtKt−1)αL1−α
t − F = Ct + Gt + It + Ψ(Zt)Kt−1 (56)
We examine the dynamic behaviour in the vicinity of a steady state in which the govern-
ment budget constraint is in balance; i.e.,
TRt + PtGt = (TY,t + TC,t)PtYt + TL,tWtLt + Mt − Mt−1 (57)
As in Coenen et al. (2005) we further assume that changes in government spending are
ﬁnanced exclusively by changes in lump-sum taxes with tax rates TY,t, TC,t and TL,t held
constant at their steady-state values.
Given the interest rate Rt (expressed later in terms of an optimal or IFB rule) the
money supply is ﬁxed by the central banks to accommodate money demand. By Walras’
Law we can dispense with the bond market equilibrium condition and therefore the house-
hold constraint. Then the equilibrium is deﬁned at t = 0 by stochastic processes Ct, Bt,
It, Pt, Mt, Lt, Kt, Zt, RK,t, Wt, Yt, given past price indices and exogenous shocks and
government spending processes.
In what follows we will assume a ‘cashless economy’ version of the model in which both
seigniorage in (57) and the utility contribution of money balances in (33) are negligible.
Then given the nominal interest rate, our chosen monetary instrument, we can dispense
altogether with the money demand relationship (39). For estimation purposes the model
is closed with a “empirical Taylor rule” speciﬁed in section 4.
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For the cashless economy, deterministic zero-inﬂation steady state, denoted by variables
without the time subscripts, Et−1(UC,t) = 1 and Et−1(UL,t) = κ is given by
1 = β(1 + R) (58)
Q = β(Q(1 − δ) + RKZ − Ψ(Z)) (59)
RK = Ψ′(Z) (60)
Q = 1 (61)
































Y = C + (δ + Ψ(Z))K + G (67)
TR + PG = (TY + TC)PY + TLWL (68)
giving us 11 equations to determine R, Z, Q, W
P , L, K, RK, MC, C, Y and possible tax
structures, (TR, TY , TC), given G. In this cashless economy the price level is indetermi-
nate.
The solution for steady state values decomposes into a number of independent calcu-





which is therefore pinned down by the household’s discount factor. Equations (59) to (61)
give
1 = β[1 − δ + ZΨ′(Z) − Ψ(Z)] (70)
which determines steady state capacity utilization. As in SW we assume that Z = 1 and
Ψ(1) = 0 so that (70) and (60) imply that RK = Ψ′(Z) = 1
β −1+δ = R+δ meaning that
perfect capital market conditions apply in the deterministic steady state.11
11As we shall see later Z is socially eﬃcient thus justifying the assumption Z = 1.
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Denote the total tax wedge by T between the real eﬀective wage income of households
(the purchasing power of the post-tax wage) and the real eﬀective labour cost of ﬁrms.
Then
T ≡ 1 −
1 − TY
(1 + TC)(1 + TL)
≃ TY + TC + TL (73)
































ακ(1 − h)σ (74)
Equations (74), with K
L deﬁned by (71), and RK = 1
β − 1 + δ deﬁne the natural rate of
output in terms of underlying parameters and the tax wedge T. Thus given government
spending as a proportion of GDP, the natural rate of output falls as market power in
output and labour markets increases (with decreases in ζ and η respectively) and the tax
wedge T increases. However external habit in consumption causes households to supply
more labour thus increasing the natural rate of output. Market power, taxes and external
habit are all sources of ineﬃciency, but as we shall see in section 5, they do not impact on
eﬃciency in the same direction.
3.7 Linearization about the Zero-Inﬂation Steady State
We now linearize about the deterministic zero-inﬂation steady state. Deﬁne all lower case
variables as proportional deviations from this baseline steady state except for rates of
24
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 709











(rt − Etπt+1 + EtuC,t+1 − uC,t)





























(1 − βξp)(1 − ξp)
(1 + βγp)ξp
mct
kt = (1 − δ)kt−1 + δit
mct = (1 − α)wrt +
α
RK


















(1 − βξw)(1 − ξw)





(ct − hct−1) + φlt + uL,t + ǫW,t+1
lt = kt−1 +
1
RK
(1 + ψ)rK,t − wrt
yt = cyct + gygt + iyit + kyψrK,t
yt = φF[at + α(
ψ
RK
rK,t + kt−1) + (1 − α)lt] where φF = 1 +
F
Y
uC,t+1 = ρCuC,t + ǫC,t+1
uL,t+1 = ρLuL,t + ǫL,t+1
uI,t+1 = ρIuI,t + ǫI,t+1
gt+1 = ρggt + ǫg,t+1
at+1 = ρaat + ǫa,t+1
where ‘ineﬃcient cost-push’ shocks ǫQ,t+1, ǫP,t+1 and ǫW,t+1 have been added to the value
of capital, marginal cost and marginal rate of substitution equations respectively. Vari-
ables yt, ct, mct, uC,t, uN,t, at, gt are proportional deviations about the steady state.
[ǫC,t,ǫN,t,ǫg,t,ǫa,t] are i.i.d. disturbances. πt, rK,t and rt are absolute deviations about the
steady state.13






where X is the baseline steady state. For
variables expressing a rate of change over time such as it, xt = Xt − X.
13In the SW model they deﬁne ˆ rK,t =
rK,t
RK . Then zt =
Ψ′(Z)
ZΨ′′(Z)ˆ rK,t = ψˆ rK,t. In our set-up zt =
ψ
RK rK,t
has been eliminated. (75) has a term in rK,t omitted in SW, a mistake also corrected in Levin et al. (2006).
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January 2007For later use we require the output gap the diﬀerence between output for the sticky price
model obtained above and output when prices and wages are ﬂexible, ˆ yt say. Following
SW we also eliminate the ineﬃcient shocks from this target level of output. The latter,
obtained by setting ξp = ξw = ǫQ,t+1 = ǫP,t+1 = ǫW,t+1 = 0 in the sticky-price linearizarion











(ˆ rt − Etˆ πt+1 + EtuC,t+1 − uC,t)













ˆ kt = (1 − δ)ˆ kt−1 + δˆ it
  mct = 0 = (1 − α) ˆ wrt +
α
RK
ˆ rK,t − at
  mrst =   wrt =
σ
1 − h
(ˆ ct − hˆ ct−1) + φˆ lt + uL,t
ˆ lt = ˆ kt−1 +
1
RK
(1 + ψ)ˆ rK,t − ˆ wrt
ˆ yt = cyˆ ct + gygt + iyˆ it + kyψˆ rK,t
ˆ yt = φF[at + α(
ψ
RK
ˆ rK,t + ˆ kt−1) + (1 − α)ˆ lt]
Table 1 provides a summary of our notation.
14Note that the zero-inﬂation steady states of the sticky and ﬂexi-price steady states are the same.
26
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 709
January 2007πt producer price inﬂation over interval [t − 1,t]
rt nominal interest rate over interval [t,t + 1]
wrt = wt − pt real wage
mct marginal cost
mrs marginal rate of substitution between work and consumption
lt employment
zt capacity utilization
kt end-of-period t capital stock
it investment
rK,t return on capital
qt Tobin’s Q
ct consumption
yt, ˆ yt output with sticky prices and ﬂexi-prices
ot = ˆ yt − yt output gap
ui,t+1 = ρaui,t + ǫi,t+1 AR(1) processes for utility preference shocks, ui,t, i = C, L, I
at+1 = ρaat + ǫa,t+1 AR(1) process for factor productivity shock, at
gt+1 = ρggt + ǫg,t+1 AR(1) process government spending shock, gt
β discount parameter
γp, γw indexation parameters
h habit parameter
1 − ξp, 1 − ξw probability of a price, wage re-optimization
σ risk-aversion parameter
φ disutility of labour supply parameter
ϕ 1
S′′(1)
φF 1 + F
Y
Table 1. Summary of Notation (Variables in Deviation Form).
4 Estimation
As in SW we estimate the model using Bayesian techniques. We close the model with an
empirical linearized Taylor rule of the form
rt = ρrt−1 + (1 − ρ)[¯ πt + θπEt(πt+j − ¯ πt+j) + θyot] + θ∆π(πt − πt−1) + θ∆y(ot − ot−1)
The Bayesian approach itself combines the prior distributions for the individual pa-
rameters with the likelihood function to form the posterior density. This posterior den-
sity can then be optimized with respect to the model parameters through the use of the
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January 2007Monte-Carlo Markov Chain sampling methods. The model is estimated using the Dynare
software, Juillard (2004).15 Table 2 reports the posterior mean and the 5th and 95th
percentiles of the posterior distribution obtained through the Metropolis-Hasting (MH)
sampling algorithm (using 100,000 draws from the posterior and an average “acceptance
rate” of around 0.25) for the various model variants as well as the marginal likelihood
(LL). Note, in re-estimating we use identical priors to those used in SW.
In the table we report results for ﬁve models: the core SW model, then the SW model
without indexing in wages, γw = 0, without indexing in prices, γp = 0, with neither and
ﬁnally the SW model with a 4-quarter average price contract, ξp = 0.75, imposed. From
the LL values and the model posterior probabilities (with equal priors) we can see that the
model without any indexing performs the best, followed by the core SW mode, followed
by the model with only price indexing with ξp = 0.75 massively behind the others. The
latter variant is therefore only empirically supported if the priors are very strongly in its
favour.16 In Section 6, we provide results for the core SW model and the γp = γw = 0 and
ξp = 0.75 variants.
15We are grateful to Gregory De Walque and Raf Wouters for providing the SW model in Dynare code.
16As discussed in Geweke (1999), the Bayesian approach to estimation allows a formal comparison of
diﬀerent models based on their marginal likelihoods. The marginal likelihood of Model Mi is given by,
p(Y | Mi) =
 
Ξ
p(ξ | Mi)p(Y | ξ,Mi)dξ
where p(ξ | Mi) is the prior density for model Mi and p(Y | ξ,Mi) is the data density for model Mi given
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January 2007Core γw = 0 γp = 0 γw = γp = 0 ξp = 0.75
ρa 0.89 [0.81:0.96] 0.89 [0.82:0.97] 0.87 [0.80:0.95] 0.88 [0.81:0.96] 0.91 [0.84:0.99]
ρpb 0.84 [0.68:0.99] 0.84 [0.68:0.99] 0.86 [0.71:0.99] 0.86 [0.70:0.99] 0.84 [0.70:0.99]
ρb 0.83 [0.77:0.89] 0.83 [0.77:0.90] 0.84 [0.78:0.90] 0.84 [0.77:0.89] 0.82 [0.74:0.92]
ρg 0.95 [0.90:0.99] 0.95 [0.91:0.99] 0.95 [0.91:0.99] 0.95 [0.91:0.99] 0.95 [0.91:0.99]
ρl 0.91 [0.84:0.97] 0.93 [0.89:0.98] 0.92 [0.88:0.98] 0.93 [0.89:0.98] 0.87 [0.78:0.97]
ρi 0.91 [0.87:0.97] 0.92 [0.86:0.97] 0.92 [0.86:0.97] 0.92 [0.87:0.98] 0.90 [0.84:0.98]
ϕ−1 6.79 [5.08:8.55] 6.70 [5.04:8.44] 6.77 [4.96:8.50] 6.78 [5.13:8.65] 6.12 [4.31:8.07]
σ 1.40 [0.94:1.86] 1.44 [0.96:1.88] 1.43 [0.97:1.91] 1.45 [0.97:1.90] 1.36 [0.93:1.76]
h 0.57 [0.45:0.68] 0.57 [0.45:0.68] 0.57 [0.45:0.68] 0.56 [0.45:0.68] 0.54 [0.41:0:68]
ξw 0.73 [0.66:0.81] 0.71 [0.64:0.77] 0.74 [0.66:0.81] 0.71 [0.65:0.78] 0.76 [0.67:0.84]
φ 2.40 [1.37:3.35] 2.31 [1.29:3.23] 2.39 [1.44:3.39] 2.38 [1.39:3.33] 2.17 [1.28:3.21]
ξp 0.91 [0.89:0.92] 0.91 [0.89:0.92] 0.89 [0.87:0.91] 0.90 [0.88:0.92] 0.75 [-]
γw 0.69 [0.44:0.94] - 0.66 [0.40:0.93] - 0.44 [0.19:0.67]
γp 0.44 [0.26:0.60] 0.42 [0.25:0.59] - - 0.46 [0.30:0.63]
ψ−1 0.32 [0.21:0.42] 0.32 [0.21:0.42] 0.32 [0.21:0.42] 0.32 [0.21:0.42] 0.34 [0.24:0:45]
φF 1.56 [1.39:1.73] 1.57 [1.40:1.74] 1.55 [1.37:1.72] 1.55 [1.39:1.72] 1.59 [1.42:1.76]
θπ 1.69 [1.54:1.86] 1.70 [1.53:1.86] 1.69 [1.53:1.84] 1.69 [1.52:1.85] 1.69 [1.53:1.87]
θ∆π 0.15 [0.07:0.23] 0.17 [0.09:0.24] 0.17 [0.08:0.25] 0.17 [0.09:0.26] 0.14 [0.06:0.23]
ρ 0.96 [0.94:0.98] 0.96 [0.94:0.98] 0.96 [0.95:0.98] 0.96 [0.95:0.98] 0.96 [0.94:0:98]
θy 0.11 [0.04:0.18] 0.10 [0.03:0.17] 0.11 [0.04:0.19] 0.11 [0.04:0.18] 0.12 [0.05:0.19]
θ∆y 0.15 [0.11:0.19] 0.15 [0.12:0.19] 0.15 [0.12:0.19] 0.16 [0.13:0.20] 0.16 [0.12:0.19]
sd(ǫa) 0.50 [0.39:0.59] 0.49 [0.38:0.58] 0.50 [0.38:0.61] 0.49 [0.39:0.59] 0.47 [0.37:0.57]
sd(ǫ¯ π) 0.01 [0.00:0.06] 0.02 [0.00:0.02] 0.02 [0.00:0.03] 0.05 [0.00:0.03] 0.02 [0.01:0.03]
sd(ǫC) 0.38 [0.20:0.56] 0.38 [0.20:0.54] 0.38 [0.19:0.56] 0.37 [0.21:0.54] 0.32 [0.13:0.54]
sd(ǫg) 1.99 [1.73:2.26] 1.99 [1.74:2.26] 1.98 [1.73:2.25] 1.97 [1.73:2.23] 2.00 [1.72:2.24]
sd(ǫL) 3.33 [1.80:4.88] 2.92 [1.58:4.17] 3.22 [1.93:4.55] 3.01 [1.77:4.13] 3.10 [1.65:4.44]
sd(ǫI) 0.07 [0.03:0.10] 0.07 [0.03:0.10] 0.07 [0.03:0.11] 0.07 [0.03:0.10] 0.06 [0.03:0.10]
sd(ǫR) 0.08 [0.04:0.11] 0.09 [0.06:0.13] 0.08 [0.04:0.11] 0.08 [0.05:0.12] 0.08 [0.04:0.12]
sd(ǫQ) 0.61 [0.50:0.70] 0.61 [0.50:0.70] 0.61 [0.52:0.72] 0.61 [0.52:0.73] 0.60 [0.50:0.69]
sd(ǫP) 0.16 [0.13:0.18] 0.16 [0.14:0.19] 0.21 [0.18:0.25] 0.22 [0.18:0.26] 0.34 [0.29:0.39]
sd(ǫW) 0.29 [0.24:0.33] 0.27 [0.23:0.31] 0.29 [0.25:0.34] 0.27 [0.23:0.31] 0.33 [0.26:0.39]
LL -298.72 -298.96 -299.02 -298.17 -348.82
prob 0.235 0.185 0.174 0.407 0.000
Table 2. Bayesian Estimation of Parameters
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January 20075 Is There a Long-Run Inﬂationary Bias?
As we have seen a long-run inﬂationary bias under discretion arises only if the steady
state associated with zero inﬂation, about which we have linearized, is ineﬃcient. To
examine the ineﬃciency of the steady state we consider the social planner’s problem for















with respect to {Ct}, {Kt}, {Lt} and {Zt} subject to the resource constraint
Yt = At(ZtKt−1)αL1−α
t − F = Ct + Gt + Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1 + Ψ(Zt)Kt−1 (76)
To solve this optimization problem deﬁne the Lagrangian






t − Ct − Gt − Kt + (1 − δ)Kt−1 − Ψ(Zt)Kt−1
 
First order conditions are:
Ct : (Ct − hCt−1)−σ − βh(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ −  t = 0
Kt : − t +
 







 t+1 = 0
Lt : −κL
φ





 t = 0






The eﬃcient steady-state levels of output Yt+1 = Yt = Yt−1 = Y ∗, say, is therefore
found by solving the system:
[(1 − h)C]
−σ (1 − βh) −   = 0 (77)





− βΨ(Z) = 0 (78)












Solving as we did for the natural rate and denoting the social optimum by Z∗, Y ∗ etc
we arrive at
1 = β[1 − δ + Z∗Ψ′(Z∗) − Ψ(Z∗)] (81)
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it follows that the natural capital-labour ratio is below the social optimum. The socially






























The ineﬃciency of the natural rate of output can now be found by comparing (74)
with (83). Since Y φ+δ is an increasing function of Y , we arrive at17
Proposition
The natural level of output, Y , is below the eﬃcient level, Y ∗, if and only if

























































− 1 + δ








summarizes the overall distortion
in the steady state natural level of output as a result of four elements: taxes, market power
in the output and labour markets and external habit.18 Assume government spending is
adjusted so that G
Y = G∗
Y ∗. Since there are reasons from the IO literature for assuming
17This generalizes the result in Choudhary and Levine (2006) which considered the same model, but
without capital.
18This generalizes Woodford (2003), page 394, to include capital, labour-market power and habit.
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January 2007Ramsey ﬁxed investment may be excessive as well as too little compared with the social
optimum, we also put F
Y = F∗
Y ∗. It then follows that Θ > 1. In the case where there is no
habit persistence (h = 0), then Φy > 0 and (84) always holds. Then tax distortions and
market power in the output and labour markets, captured by the elasticities η ∈ (0,∞)
and ζ ∈ (0,∞) respectively, drive the natural rate of output below the eﬃcient level. If
h = T = 0 and η = ζ = ∞, tax distortions and market power both disappear, Φy = 0 and
the natural rate is eﬃcient. But if h > 0, this leads to the possibility that Φy < 0 and
then the natural rate of output is actually above the eﬃcient level (see Choudhary and
Levine (2006)).
The intuition behind this result is that external habit ensures that each household’s
consumption is a negative externality that reduces the welfare of others. The greater is
h the greater is this externality. In the eﬃcient case the social planner internalizes this
externality and, given the other distortions, chooses less consumption and more leisure
than the decentralized households in the consumption/leisure trade-oﬀ. Consequently in
the absence of other distortions output is lower in the eﬃcient case. On the other hand,
distortions in the output and labour markets, captured by low ζ and η and a high tax
wedge T, tend to raise the social planner’s choice of output relative to the natural rate.
Condition (84) shows the inter-play between these opposing eﬀects.
An interesting implication of our results is that there may exist a socially optimal
positive tax wedge in the steady state for high values of the habit parameter, h. This
value can be found by equating Y = Y (T) and Y ∗ and solving for T. Figure 1 plots the
optimal rate of tax wedge at the steady state for various values of the habit parameter
h and the parameter η that captures market power in the labour market. The ﬁgure
suggests that the tax wedge can be corrective rather than distortionary (as argued by
Layard (2005)), if habit is strong and the labour markets is competitive, with η is high.
In fact in the core SW model where the unidentiﬁed parameter η is set at η = 3 and
h = 0.57 the optimal tax wedge is clearly negative (implying a subsidy) which contrasts
with an average tax wedge of T = 0.64 for the euro area in 2004 reported in Coenen et al.
(2005).19
19Apart from the estimated parameter values for the unaltered SW model, we choose β = 0.99 and ζ = 7,
the latter corresponding to a 15% mark-up of the price over marginal cost. Note that an examination of
the linearized form of the model reveals the fact that η and ζ are not identiﬁed.
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Figure 1: The Optimal Tax Rate as h and η vary.
6 Optimal Monetary Stabilization Policy
6.1 Formulating the Policymaker’s Loss Function
Much of the optimal monetary policy literature has stayed with the ad hoc loss function













Indeed Clarida et al. (1999) provide a stout defence of a hybrid research strategy that
combines a loss function based on the stated objectives of central banks with a micro-
founded macro-model. A normative assessment of policy rules requires welfare analysis
and for this, given our linear-quadratic framework,20 we require a quadratic approximation
of the representative consumer’s utility function.
20We have emphasized the convenience of the LQ approach to optimal policy. However, recent develop-
ments in numerical methods now allow the researcher to go beyond linear approximations of their models
and to conduct analysis of both the dynamics and welfare using higher-order (usually second-order) ap-
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January 2007A common procedure for reducing optimal policy to a LQ problem is as follows. Lin-
earize the model about a deterministic steady state as we have already done. Then expand
the consumer’s utility function as a second-order Taylor series after imposing the econ-
omy’s resource constraint. In general this procedure is incorrect unless the steady state
is not too far from the eﬃcient outcome (see Woodford (2003), chapter 6, Benigno and
Woodford (2004), Kim and Kim (2006) and Levine et al. (2006)). This we assume and
for this case we show in Appendix C that a quadratic single-period loss function that
approximates the utility takes the form
where positive weights wc etc are deﬁned in Appendix C. All variables are in log-deviation
form about the steady state as in the linearization.21 The ﬁrst four terms in (86) give the
welfare loss from consumption, employment, price inﬂation and wage inﬂation variability
respectively. The remaining terms are contributions from arise from the resource constraint
in our quadratic approximation procedure.
6.2 Imposing the Interest Rate Zero Lower Bound
In the analysis that follows we adopt a single period loss function of the form
(87)
where Ut is given by (86). As explained in section 2.2.1, the policymaker’s optimization
problem is to choose an unconditional distribution for rt (i.e., the steady state variance)
shifted to the right about a new non-zero steady state inﬂation rate and a higher nominal
interest rate, such that the probability, p, of the interest rate hitting the lower bound is
very low. This is implemented by calibrating the weight wr for each of our policy rules
so that z0(p)σr < R where z0(p) is the critical value of a standard normally distributed
variable Z such that prob (Z ≤ z0) = p, R = 1
β −1+π∗ is the steady state nominal interest
rate, σr is the unconditional variance and π∗ is the new steady state inﬂation rate. Given
σr the steady state positive inﬂation rate that will ensure rt ≥ 0 with probability 1 − p is
21Our quadratic approximation is along the lines of Onatski and Williams (2004) with some diﬀerences.
Note the expression is not exactly positive deﬁnite, but this is of no consequence since positive-deﬁniteness
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Ut = wc(ct − hct−1)2 + wll2
t + wπ(πt − γpπt−1)2 + w∆w(∆wt − γw∆wt−1)2
+ wlk(lt − kt−1 − zt −
1
1 − α
at)2 + wz(zt + ψat)2 − walatlt − wi(it − it−1)2 (86)
Lt = Ut + wr(rt − r∗
t)2given by22







In our linear-quadratic framework we can write the intertemporal expected welfare loss
at time t = 0 as the sum of stochastic and deterministic components, Ω0 = ˜ Ω0 + ¯ Ω0.
By increasing wr we can lower σr thereby decreasing π∗ and reducing the deterministic
component, but at the expense of increasing the stochastic component of the welfare loss.
By exploiting this trade-oﬀ, we then arrive at the optimal policy that, in the vicinity of
the steady state, imposes the zero lower bound constraint, rt ≥ 0 with probability 1 − p.
Tables 3a and 3b show the results of this optimization procedure under discretion and
commitment respectively using the loss function given by (86), with wπ and other weights
functions of fundamental parameters given in Appendix C.23 We choose p = 0.025. Given
wr, denote the expected intertemporal loss (stochastic plus deterministic components) at
time t = 0 by Ω0(wr). This includes a term penalizing the variance of the interest rate
which does not contribute to utility loss as such, but rather represents the interest rate
lower bound constraint. Actual utility, found by subtracting the interest rate term, is
given by Ω0(0). The steady state inﬂation rate, π∗, that will ensure the lower bound is
reached only with probability p = 0.025 is computed using (88). Given π∗, we can then
evaluate the deterministic component of the welfare loss, ¯ Ω0. Since in the new steady
state the real interest rate is unchanged, the steady state involving real variables are also
unchanged, so from (86) we can write
¯ Ω0(0) =
 
wπ(1 − γp)2 + w∆w(1 − γw)2 
π∗2 (89)
Both the ex-ante optimal and the optimal time-consistent deterministic welfare loss that
guide the economy from a zero-inﬂation steady state to π = π∗ diﬀer from ¯ Ω0(0) (but not
by much because the steady state contributions by far outweighs the transitional one).
From a timeless perspective (see Appendix A.1.2), however, the policymaker will jump
immediately to the new steady state justifying the use of (89).
22If the ineﬃciency of the steady-state output is negligible, then π
∗ ≥ 0 is a credible the new steady state
inﬂation rate. It contrasts with a transitional deﬂationary bias highlighted by Krugman (1998), Eggertsson
(2006) and Adam and Billi (2006) which arises under discretion because the central bank cannot credibly
lower the expected real interest rate, following a negative demand shock, by a promise to raise the inﬂation
rate in the future. It must therefore rely on lowering the interest rate, hitting the zero lower bound more
often. Reduced inﬂationary expectations, in turn, causes a temporary negative inﬂation bias. This eﬀect
is absent in the approximate approach to imposing the constraint in this paper.
23The solution procedures set out in Appendix A actually require a very small weight on the instrument.
One can get round this without signiﬁcantly changing the result by letting inﬂation be the instrument
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January 2007Tables 3a and 3b demonstrate the trade-oﬀ between reducing the stochastic compo-
nent of policy at the expense of a higher steady state inﬂation rate and therefore higher
deterministic component of policy. Under discretion in table 3a the optimal combination
(i.e., the minimum of ΩTC
0 (0)) is achieved at π∗ = 0.52, or at an inﬂation rate around
2% per year. This pins down the parameter penalizing the variability of the interest rate
at wr = 4. The same exercise for optimal policy under commitment sees π∗ = 0.26 with
wr = 20, but in the case the loss function is very ﬂat as wr falls from the value that results
in π∗ = 0, so there is little to gain from raising the steady inﬂation and interest rates.
Figure 2 further demonstrates the results in table 3a. The top-left ﬁgure shows the
distribution for the nominal interest with zero steady state inﬂation for the case wTC
r = 2
where σr = 1.00. The probability of hitting the zero lower bound is now high, of the
order p = 0.30. If in the top-right ﬁgure, the steady state inﬂation increases to π∗ = 0.95,
thus shifting the distribution by this amount to the right, the probability of rt ≤ 0 falls
to p = 0.025. However this choice of π∗ and σr is sub-optimal. In the bottom-left ﬁgure
keeping p = 0.025, the total welfare loss falls if we set σr = 0.74 and π∗ = 0.68, values
obtained by tightening the variability constraint to wr = 3. Finally in the bottom right
ﬁgure illustrates the optimal combination of σr = 0.62 and π∗ = 0.52 at p = 0.025,
obtained at wr = 4 and highlighted in table 3a.
By reporting the expected intertemporal utility loss at time t = 0 under both the time-
consistent discretionary policy and optimal commitment, ΩTC
0 (0) and ΩOP
0 (0) respectively,
we can now assess the stabilization gains from commitment as the interest rate lower bound
takes greater eﬀect. We compute these gains as equivalent permanent percentage increases














A further useful expression is the minimum cost of ﬂuctuations24 in consumption and











Table 3b reports cmin
e and table 3c the gains from commitment under three scenarios:
the ﬁrst where the lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is ignored (wTC
r =
wOP
r = 0), the second under optimal combinations of σr and π∗ highlighted in tables 3a
24But it should be noted that our quadratic approximation to the utility function omits terms indepen-
dent of policy so the cost of ﬂuctuations is under-estimated.
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Figure 2: Imposing the Interest Rate Zero Lower Bound under Discretion.
and 3b (wTC
r = 4, wOP
r = 20), and third, under an added constraint that the steady-state
inﬂation rate remains at zero (wTC
r = 60, wOP
r = 45). A number of interesting points
emerge from these tables. First using (91) the minimal cost of consumption ﬂuctuations is
given by ΩOP = 0.55 a value much larger than the welfare cost reported by Lucas (1987)
which was of the order 0.05%. Taking into account the fact we have omitted ﬂuctuation
costs from terms independent of policy, our ﬁgures are of the order of those reported in
Levin et al. (2006) for a similar model but without the nominal interest rate lower bound.
The reason why they are much larger in these models is down to the welfare costs of price
and wage inﬂation not included in the Lucas calculations and to the estimated variances
of the shocks.25 Our ﬁgure rises when we impose the interest rate lower bound and is
25The Lucas calculation is based on sd(ct) = 1.5% which is somewhat lower than the standard deviation
we found under optimal commitment of sd(ct) = 2.7%. Reworking the Lucas calculation would then give
a consumption equivalent loss from ﬂuctuations of 0.16%, still a low ﬁgure and far below the loss reported
above and by Levin et al. (2006).
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a increase in consumption. Thus in our set-up the answer to the question posed by Lucas,
“Is there a Case for Stabilization Policy?” is very much in the aﬃrmative.
Second, the most important point from these tables endorses the conclusion reached
by Adam and Billi (2006) discussed in the Introduction, namely that the lower bound
constraint on the nominal interest rate increases the gains from commitment several fold.
In terms of the consumption equivalent for the welfare-based case c
gain
e we can see that
the stabilization gain from commitment rises until at the optimal combination of σr and
π∗ it reaches c
gain
e = 0.42% and π
gain
e = 0.62%. They report the gains in terms of a
percentage increase in welfare loss as one proceeds from commitment to discretion. Our
results indicate an increase of 76% with is remarkably close to the 65% increase reported
for the baseline calibration in the paper (but of course for a much simpler New Keynesian
model). If we require that there is no long-run inﬂation under discretion, the commitment
gain increases dramatically to c
gain





r )2 ˜ ΩTC
0 (wr) ˜ ΩTC
0 (0) π∗ ¯ ΩTC
0 (0) ΩTC
0 (0)
0 103.6 22.2 22.2 18.9 7.08 × 103 7.10 × 103
1 1.74 27.8 26.9 1.58 49.5 76.4
2 1.00 31.4 30.5 0.95 17.9 48.4
3 0.74 34.6 33.4 0.68 9.2 42.6
4 0.61 37.5 36.2 0.52 5.4 41.6
5 0.54 40.3 39.0 0.43 3.7 42.7
10 0.40 55.7 53.7 0.23 1.0 54.7
50 0.31 420 412 0.08 0.1 412
60 0.25 497 489 0 0 489
Table 3a. Core Model: Optimal Discretion.
π∗ = max[z0(p)σTC
r −( 1
β −1)×100,0] = max[1.96σTC
r −1.01,0] with p = 2.5% probability
of hitting the zero-lower bound and β = 0.99.
¯ ΩTC
0 (0) = 1
2
 
wπ(1 − γp)2 + w∆w(1 − γw)2 
π∗2 = 19.81π∗2.
ΩTC
0 (0) = ˜ ΩTC
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r (σOP
r )2 ˜ ΩOP
0 (wr) ˜ ΩOP




0 28.1 17.1 17.1 9.4 1.75 × 103 1.75 × 103 41.2
10 0.65 23.9 20.8 0.57 6.44 27.2 0.63
20 0.42 26.3 22.4 0.260 1.34 23.7 0.55
30 0.33 28.0 23.5 0.116 0.27 23.8 0.55
40 0.27 29.4 24.3 0.01 0.002 24.3 0.56
45 0.25 30.0 24.8 0 0 24.8 0.58
50 0.24 30.5 25.1 0 0 25.1 0.58
Table 3b. Core Model: Optimal Commitment.










(0,0) (10.1, 5.3) (0,0) 0.12 0.44
(4,20) (0.78, 0.65) (0.52, 0.26) 0.42 0.62
(60,45) (0.5, 0.5) (0,0) 10.8 3.20
Table 3c. Core Model: Stabilization Gains From Commitment:
% Consumption Equivalent (c
gain
e ) and % Inﬂation Equivalent (π
gain
e )
π∗, ΩOP(0) deﬁned as for discretion above.
In tables 4 and 5 we repeat the same exercise for ﬁrst, the preferred model variant
without any indexation, and then for the low price stickiness variant of the model ξp = 0.75,
as opposed to ξp = 0.91 or ξp = 0.90 freely estimated for the core and no indexation
variants respectively.
From tables 4a–4c we see that similar results to those of the core model are obtained
for the no indexation variant. The welfare gains from commitment are now a little higher
at c
gain
e = 0.47% but without the inﬂation inertia bought about by indexation, this is
achieved at a lower optimal steady-state inﬂation rates under discretion, π∗ = 0.18% as
opposed to π∗ = 0.52% for the core model. Similarly under commitment the optimal
steady-state inﬂation rate is lower in the no indexation model. In the absence of inﬂation
inertia it is now far less costly to impose a zero long-run inﬂation under discretion and
doing so increases the commitment gain by a modest amount.
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r (σTC
r )2 ˜ ΩTC
0 (wr) ˜ ΩTC
0 (0) π∗ ¯ ΩTC
0 (0) ΩTC
0 (0)
0 32.8 19.5 19.5 10.2 1.06 × 104 1.06 × 104
1 2.03 25.2 25.2 1.78 323 348
2 1.09 29.8 28.7 1.04 110 139
3 0.76 32.5 31.4 0.70 95.8 127
4 0.59 34.9 33.7 0.50 25.5 59.2
5 0.49 37.0 35.8 0.36 13.2 49.0
6 0.42 39.0 37.7 0.26 6.9 44.6
7 0.37 40.9 39.6 0.18 3.30 42.9
10 0.28 46.1 44.7 0.03 0.09 44.8
12 0.25 49.5 48.0 0 0 48.0
Table 4a. No Indexation Model (γp = γw = 0): Optimal Discretion.
π∗ = max[z0(p)σTC
r −( 1
β −1)×100,0] = max[1.96σTC
r −1.01,0] with p = 2.5% probability
of hitting the zero-lower bound and β = 0.99.
¯ ΩTC
0 (0) = 1
2
 
wπ(1 − γp)2 + w∆w(1 − γw)2 
π∗2 = 101.8π∗2. ΩTC
0 (0) = ˜ ΩTC




r )2 ˜ ΩOP
0 (wr) ˜ ΩOP




0 14.6 14.7 14.7 6.48 4.27 × 103 4.29 × 103 99.8
10 0.67 22.3 19.1 0.59 35.4 54.5 1.27
20 0.41 24.8 20.9 0.25 6.36 27.3 0.63
25 0.35 25.7 21.5 0.15 2.29 23.8 0.55
30 0.31 26.4 22.0 0.08 0.65 22.7 0.53
40 0.26 27.8 23.0 0 0 23.0 0.53
42 0.25 28.0 23.1 0 0 23.1 0.54
Table 4b. No Indexation Model: Optimal Commitment.










(0,0) (5.7, 3.8) (0,0) 0.11 0.32
(7,30) (0.61, 0.56) (0.18, 0.08) 0.47 0.66
(12,42) (0.5, 0.5) (0,0) 0.58 0.66
Table 4c. No Indexation: Stabilization Gains From Commitment
π∗, ΩOP(0) deﬁned as above.
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inﬂation are now much lower and, in the absence of commitment, the incentive to raise
or lower inﬂation following shocks correspondingly higher. The lower interest rate bound
acts as a greater constraint for optimal discretion and as a consequence, as tables 5a–5c
show, the gains from commitment rise considerably to c
gain





r )2 ˜ ΩTC
0 (wr) ˜ ΩTC
0 (0) π∗ ¯ ΩTC
0 (0) ΩTC
0 (0)
0 116 26.1 26.1 20.1 2.8 × 103 2.9 × 103
0.5 6.9 35.2 33.4 4.14 120 153
0.6 6.3 37.1 35.2 3.91 107 142
0.7 6.0 39.2 37.1 3.78 100 137
0.8 5.7 41.4 39.1 3.68 95 134
0.9 5.6 43.9 41.4 3.61 92 133
1.00 5.5 46.5 43.8 3.59 90.3 134
27 0.25 375 371 0 0 375
Table 5a. Low Price Stickiness Model (ξp = 0.75): Optimal Discretion.
π∗ = max[z0(p)σTC
r −( 1
β −1)×100,0] = max[1.96σTC
r −1.01,0] with p = 2.5% probability
of hitting the zero-lower bound and β = 0.99.
¯ ΩTC
0 (0) = 1
2
 
wπ(1 − γp)2 + w∆w(1 − γw)2 
π∗2 = 7.02π∗2. ΩTC
0 (0) = ˜ ΩTC




r )2 ˜ ΩOP
0 (wr) ˜ ΩOP




0 36 19.8 19.8 10.8 819 839 19.5
10 1.1 31.4 26.3 1.05 7.74 34.0 0.79
15 0.81 33.6 28.1 0.75 3.99 32.1 0.74
20 0.62 35.2 29.6 0.53 1.97 31.6 0.73
30 0.41 37.4 31.9 0.25 0.44 32.3 0.75
45 0.25 39.5 34.5 0 0 34.5 0.80










(0,0) (116, 36) (0,0) 0.15 1.10
(0.9,25) (5.56, 0.62) (3.61,0.53) 2.35 4.39
(27,45) (0.25, 0.25) (0,0) 7.83 8.02
Table 5c. ξp = 0.75 Model: Stabilization Gains From Commitment.
41
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 709
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is that the stabilization gains from commitment are signiﬁcantly greater than those pre-
viously reported in the literature. For the empirically supported model variants, the core
model and the alternative with no indexation we ﬁnd these gains to be a 0.4−0.5% equiva-
lent permanent increase in consumption corresponding to a 0.6−0.7% permanent increase
in quarterly inﬂation. The latter, for instance, compares with a range of 0.04 − 0.4%
found in the comprehensive study of Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2006) across several mod-
els.26 Moreover in our variant with a more plausible degree of price stickiness, gains of
over 2% consumption equivalent are found.
6.3 Stabilization Gains with Simple Rules
We now turn to results for simple commitment rules of the general form:
rt = ρrt−1 + ΘπEtπt+j + Θy(yt − ˆ yt) + Θ∆w∆wt + Θwrwrt (92)
where ρ ∈ [0,1], Θπ,Θy,Θ∆w,Θwr > 0,j ≥ 0. Putting Θ∆w = Θwr = 0 gives the standard
Taylor rule where the interest rate only to current price inﬂation and the output gap,
Θ∆w = Θwr = Θy = 0 gives a price inﬂation rule, Θπ = Θwr = Θy = 0 gives a wage
inﬂation rule and j = Θ∆w = Θy = 0 gives a current price inﬂation and real wage rule.
Results for these rules are summarized in table 6 for the core model. Since the welfare
gains from increasing the steady state inﬂation rate and widening the interest rate distri-
bution consistent with p = 0.025 is very small, we conﬁne ourselves to π∗ = 0. There are
two notable results that emerge. First, we assess the eﬀect of using an arbitrary rather
than an optimized simple commitment rule by examining the outcome when a minimal
rule ii = 1.001πt that just produces saddle-path stability. This is the worst case and we
see that the costs are substantial: c
gain
e = 7.03%. Interestingly, this outcome is still better
than that under discretion if the same constraint on the variance of the interest rate as
for optimal commitment is imposed. Second, simple price inﬂation or wage inﬂation rules
perform reasonably well in that they achieve over 80% of the commitment gains achieved
by the optimal rule when π∗ = 0 is imposed. The simple rule that closely mimics optimal
commitment for the welfare-based case is the inﬂation and real wage rule.27 From table 5
26We have adjusted their reported annual inﬂation rate equivalents. Note that they examine models
without explicit micro-foundations and therefore employ an ad hoc loss function.
27This ﬁnding that simple rules should respond to labour-market conditions is in broad agreement with
the result in Levin et al. (2006). However their study, which did not incorporate a nominal interest rate
zero lower bound, found that the wage inﬂation rule performed a lot better than the price inﬂation and
closely mimicked optimal commitment.
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still leaves a small cost of c
gain
e = 0.02% and π
gain
e = 0.15% ≈ 0.60% on an annual basis.
Tables 7 and 8 again repeats the same exercise for the variants of the model with no
indexation and with ξp = 0.75 imposed. A similar story emerges: by far the best simple
interest rate rule is one that responds to current inﬂation and the real wage with a higher,
but still quite small, costs of simplicity of c
gain
e = 0.02 − 0.07%. For the model without
indexation, the wage inﬂation rule performs a lot better than the price inﬂation rule and,
in that respect, reproduces the ﬁnding of Levin et al. (2006). It is of interest to note that,
in these alternative variants, the costs of the minimal rules are far less.






Minimal 0 1.001 0 0 0 327 327 7.03 2.57 0.46 0
πt 0.37 1.42 0 0 45 82.4 77.0 1.21 1.07 0.24 0
∆wt 0.95 0 0.68 0 25 80.3 77.2 1.22 1.08 0.25 0
wrt, πt 0.96 0.15 0 0.20 55 32.9 25.8 0.02 0.15 0.26 0
OP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 45 30.0 24.8 0 0 0.25 0
Table 6. Comparison of Optimal Commitment Rules. Core model.






Minimal 0 1.001 0 0 0 397 8.70 2.86 4.50 0.13 0
πt 0.43 2.55 0 0 23 77.2 74.3 1.19 1.06 0.25 0
∆wt 1.00 0 0.71 0 42 59.4 54.2 0.73 0.82 0.25 0
wrt, πt 0.93 0.37 0 0.23 43 29.4 24.0 0.02 0.14 0.25 0
OP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 42 28.0 23.1 0 0 0.25 0
Table 7. Comparison of Optimal Commitment Rules: No Indexation Model
(γp = γw = 0).






Minimal 0 1.001 0 0 0 90.4 90.4 1.30 3.27 2.87 0
πt 0.67 0.39 0 0 80 85.4 75.4 0.95 2.80 0.25 0
∆wt 0.72 0 0.52 0 16 86.3 84.3 1.16 3.09 0.25 0
wrt, πt 1.00 0.06 0 0.08 62 45.4 37.3 0.07 0.73 0.26 0
OP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 45 39.5 34.5 0 0 0.25 0
Table 8. Comparison of Optimal Commitment Rules: Low Price Stickiness
Model (ξp = 0.75).
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Figures 5-12 compare the responses under the optimal commitment, discretion and the
optimized simple inﬂation/real wage rule following an unanticipated government spending
shock (g0 = 1) and an unanticipated productivity shock (a0 = 1).
In order to interpret these graphs it is useful to consider the four sources of the time-
inconsistency problem in our model; namely, from forward-looking pricing, consumption,
investment and wage setting. Following a shock which diverts the economy from its steady
state, given expectations of inﬂation, the opportunist policy-maker can increase or decrease
output by reducing or increasing the interest rate which increases or decreases inﬂation.
Consider the case where the economy is below the its steady state level of output. A
reduction in the interest rate then causes consumption demand rise. Firms locked into
price contracts respond to an increase in demand by increasing output and increasing the
price according to their indexing rule. Those who can re-optimize increase only increase
their price. Given inﬂationary expectations, a reduction in the interest rate sees Tobin’s
Q rise, and with it investment and capital stock. This increases output on the supply side.
Given inﬂationary expectations an inﬂationary impulse results in a fall in the real wage
and an increase in labour supply, adding further to the supply side boost to output. All
these changes are for given inﬂationary expectations and illustrates the incentive to inﬂate
when the output gap increases. In an non-commitment equilibrium however the incentive
is anticipated and the result is higher inﬂation compared with the commitment case. This
contrast between the commitment and discretionary cases is seen clearly in the ﬁgures.
Finally, comparing the optimal commitment and the simple inﬂation-real wage rules, we
see how the latter closely mimics the former.
6.5 Sustaining Commitment as an Equilibrium
We now examine numerically the no-deviation condition for commitment to be a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. We conﬁne ourselves to reporting results for the core SW variant
and for the form of the condition given by (29) which assume an instantaneous loss of
reputation following deviation. Experiment revealed this to give very similar results to
those using (27), and this in turn implied that the condition relevant for our simple
inﬂation/real wage, (32), was satisﬁed.
Figure 4 plots a histogram from 10,000 draws of the sector [zT
t pT
2,t]T in the vicinity of
the steady state of the economy under the optimal commitment rule. The probability of the
weak government deviating from the optimal rule, qt, is then the proportion of these draws
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2t) <
0. For our model and sample of 10,000 draws we see that in fact qt = 0 so that optimal
commitment for a weak government turns out to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.












Figure 3: The No-Deviation Condition: Φ = tr((1 − β)(N11 + S)(Zt + βΣ) + tr((1 −
β)N22p2tpT
2t). β = 0.99
As discussed in section 3 the no-deviation condition compares the temporary stabi-
lization gains from reneging (‘temptation’) with the long-run stabilization loss from losing
reputation (the ‘penalty’). The latter depends crucially on the policymaker’s rate of dis-
count β. In all our welfare-based results we have set β = 0.99 on a quarterly basis for
both the policymaker and theeprivate sector. But suppose that the policymaker was more
myopic than the private sector. For all β ≥ 0.75 we ﬁnd that qt = 0. In ﬁgure 4 we set
β = 0.5 which could be appropriate for a non-independent central bank in which optimal
monetary policy depends on the probability of the survival (re-election) of government
was very low, in fact 0.1250 per year. We ﬁnd that there is now a very small probability
of a a break-down in the no-deviation condition, namely qt = 0.002. Thus our result that
commitment can be sustained as a PBE is very robust to variations in the policymaker’s
discount factor for all conceivable institutional arrangements in the euro-area.
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Figure 4: The No-Deviation Condition: Φ = tr((1 − β)(N11 + S)(Zt + βΣ) + tr((1 −
β)N22p2tpT
2t). β = 0.5
7 Conclusions
This paper has examined the credibility problem in an empirical DSGE model with four
sources of time-inconsistency: from forward-looking pricing, consumption, investment and
wage setting. In the absence of commitment, following a shock which diverts the economy
from its steady state and given expectations of inﬂation, the opportunist policy-maker
can increase or decrease output by reducing or increasing the interest rate which increases
or decreases inﬂation. This results in a higher variability of inﬂation and the nominal
interest rate under discretion. The latter means that the interest rate zero lower bound
constraint is tighter under discretion and its presence increases the stabilization gains from
commitment. The constraint can be relaxed by increasing the steady state inﬂation rate,
but this comes at a cost of an increase in the deterministic component of the welfare loss.
The main ﬁndings of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1. Our welfare-based loss function uses the ‘small distortions’ quadratic approximation
to the consumer’s utility which is accurate if the steady state is close to the social
optimum. In assessing this condition we highlight a neglected aspect of typical New
Keynesian models: external habit in consumption tends to make labour supply and
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eﬀect is suﬃciently high and labour market and product market distortions are not
too big then, with a suﬃciently small tax wedge, the natural rate can actually be
above the social optimum. This would then render the long-run ‘inﬂationary bias’
negative.
2. Whilst the validity of an inﬂationary bias arising from the pursuit of an ambitious
output target above its natural rate has been criticized (notably in Blinder (1998)),
our analysis suggests a rather diﬀerent form of bias arising from the interest rate
zero lower bound. We ﬁnd that the optimal steady state inﬂation rate necessary
to avoid the lower bound is far lower under commitment than under discretion, so
there is a new sense in which there is a long-run inﬂationary bias which is really an
integral part of the stabilization bias.
3. In terms of an equivalent permanent increase in consumption, c
gain
e for the welfare-
based loss function and a permanent decrease in inﬂation π
gain
e , the stabilization
gains from commitment rise considerably if the lower bound eﬀect is taken into
account. Using empirical estimates from the core model and the preferred variant
without indexation, we ﬁnd an average consumption and inﬂation-equivalent gains
of c
gain
e = 0.4 − 0.5% and π
gain
e = 0.6 − 0.7% respectively, the latter on a quarterly
basis. For the variant of the model with lower price stickiness, these rise considerably
to c
gain
e = 2.35% and π
gain
e = 4.39%
4. Given these large gains from commitment, the incentive for central banks to avoid
a loss of reputation for commitment is substantial. Consequently, unless the pol-
icymaker is implausibly myopic, a commitment rule can be sustained as a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which deviation from commitment hardly ever happens de-
spite the possibility of large exogenous shocks.
5. Simple interest rate rules should respond to labour-market conditions as well as
inﬂation. The optimal commitment rule can be closely approximated in terms of
its good stabilization properties by an interest rate rule that responds positively to
current inﬂation and to the current real wage.
There are a number of possible directions for future research. First, the robustness of
our ﬁnding that gains from commitment may be far higher than previously thought needs
to investigated further across an number of other DSGE models, including the SW model
ﬁtted to US data and small open economy models such as Adolfson et al. (2004). Second, a
more accurate quadratic approximation of the household utility can be obtained from the
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for posterior model probabilities and, for each model variant, estimates of the posterior
densities of the parameters, a consistently Bayesian approach to both the estimation and
the design of robust interest rate rules can be employed as in Batini et al. (2006).
A Details of Policy Rules
First consider the purely deterministic problem. In general policy involving several (for












where zt is an (n − m) × 1 vector of predetermined variables including non-stationary
processed, z0 is given, wt is a vector of policy variables, xt is an m × 1 vector of non-
predetermined variables and xe
t+1,t denotes rational (model consistent) expectations of
xt+1 formed at time t. Then xe








yt+1 = Ayt + Bwt (A.2)
Deﬁne target variables st by
st = Myt + Hwt (A.3)



















where Q = MTQ1M, U = MTQ1H, R = Q2 + HTQ1H, Q1 and Q2 are symmetric
and non-negative deﬁnite, R is required to be positive deﬁnite and β ∈ (0,1) is discount
factor. The procedures for evaluating the three policy rules are outlined in the rest of this
appendix (or Currie and Levine (1993) for a more detailed treatment).
A.1 The Optimal Policy with Commitment
Consider the policy-maker’s ex-ante optimal policy at t = 0. This is found by minimizing






t Qyt + 2yT
t Uwt + wT
t Rwt) +  t+1(Ayt + Bwt − yt+1) (A.6)
28See Levine et al. (2006) for a method to computationally implement this procedure.
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minimize




with respect to the arguments of L0 (except z0 which is given). Then at the optimum,
L0 = Ω0.
Redeﬁning a new costate column vector pt = β−t T
t , the ﬁrst-order conditions lead to
wt = −R−1(βBTpt+1 + UTyt) (A.8)
βATpt+1 − pt = −(Qyt + Uwt) (A.9)
Substituting (A.8) into (A.2)) we arrive at the following system under control
 
I βBR−1BT







A − BR−1UT 0






To complete the solution we require 2n boundary conditions for (A.10). Specifying z0






βtpt = 0 (A.11)
and the initial condition








is partitioned so that p1t is of dimension (n − m) × 1. Equation
(A.3), (A.8), (A.10) together with the 2n boundary conditions constitute the system under
optimal control.



































































where F = −(R + BTSB)−1(BTSA + UT),G = A − BF and
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partitioned so that S11 is (n − m) × (n − m) and S22 is m × m is the solution to the
steady-state Ricatti equation
S = Q − UF − FTUT + FTRF + β(A − BF)TS(A − BF) (A.18)







where Zt = ztzT
t . To achieve optimality the policy-maker sets p20 = 0 at time t = 0. At
time t > 0 there exists a gain from reneging by resetting p2t = 0. It can be shown that
N11 < 0 and N22 < 0.29, so the incentive to renege exists at all points along the trajectory
of the optimal policy. This is the time-inconsistency problem.
A.1.1 Implementation
The rule may also be expressed in two other forms: First as




where D = [D1 D2] is partitioned conformably with zt and p2t. The rule then consists
of a feedback on the lagged predetermined variables with geometrically declining weights
with lags extending back to time t = 0, the time of the formulation and announcement of
the policy.
The ﬁnal way of expressing the rule is express the process for wt in terms of the target
variables only, st, in the loss function. This in particular eliminates feedback from the
exogenous processes in the vector zt. Since the rule does not require knowledge of these
processes to design, Woodford (2003) refers to this as “robust” in describing it as the
Robust Optimal Explicit rule.
A.1.2 Optimal Policy from a Timeless Perspective
Noting from (A.16) that long the optimal policy we have xt = −N21zt − N22p2t, the
optimal policy “from a timeless perspective” proposed by Woodford (2003) replaces the
initial condition for optimality p20 = 0 with
Jx0 = −N21z0 − N22p20 (A.21)
29See Currie and Levine (1993), chapter 5.
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of condition is π0 = 0 thus avoiding any once-and-for-all initial surprise inﬂation. This
initial condition applies only at t = 0 and only aﬀects the deterministic component of
policy and not the stochastic, stabilization component.
A.2 The Dynamic Programming Discretionary Policy






t Qyt + 2yT
t Uwt + wT
t Rwt + βΩt+1] (A.22)
The dynamic programming solution then seeks a stationary solution of the form wt =
−Fzt in which Ωt is minimized at time t subject to (1) in the knowledge that a similar
procedure will be used to minimize Ωt+1 at time t + 1.
Suppose that the policy-maker at time t expects a private-sector response from t + 1
onwards, determined by subsequent re-optimization, of the form
xt+τ = −Nt+1zt+τ, τ ≥ 1 (A.23)
The loss at time t for the ex ante optimal policy was from (A.19) found to be a
quadratic function of xt and p2t. We have seen that the inclusion of p2t was the source of
the time inconsistency in that case. We therefore seek a lower-order controller
wt = −Fzt (A.24)
with the cost-to-go quadratic in zt only. We then write Ωt+1 = 1
2zT
t+1St+1zt+1 in (A.22).
This leads to the following iterative process for Ft
wt = −Ftzt (A.25)
where







Rt = R + KT
t Q22Kt + U2TKt + KT
t U2
Kt = −(A22 + Nt+1A12)−1(Nt+1B1 + B2)
Bt = B1 + A12Kt
Ut = U1 + Q12Kt + JT
t U2 + JT
t Q22Jt
Jt = −(A22 + Nt+1A12)−1(Nt+1A11 + A12)
At = A11 + A12Jt




t RtFt + β(At − BtFt)TSt+1(At − BtFt)
Qt = Q11 + JT
t Q21 + Q12Jt + JT
t Q22Jt
Nt = −Jt + KtFt
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, and Q similarly are partitioned
conformably with the predetermined and non-predetermined components of the state vec-
tor.
The sequence above describes an iterative process for Ft, Nt, and St starting with some
initial values for Nt and St. If the process converges to stationary values, F,N and S say,










A.3 Optimized Simple Rules
We now consider simple sub-optimal rules of the form






where D is constrained to be sparse in some speciﬁed way. Rule (A.27) can be quite
general. By augmenting the state vector in an appropriate way it can represent a PID
(proportional-integral-derivative)controller.








where P = Q+UD+DTUT +DTRD. The system under control (A.1), with wt given by
(A.27), has a rational expectations solution with xt = −Nzt where N = N(D). Hence
yT
t Pyt = zT
t Tzt (A.29)
where T = P11 − NTP21 − P12N + NTP22N, P is partitioned as for S in (A.17) onwards
and
zt+1 = (G11 − G12N)zt (A.30)
where G = A + BD is partitioned as for P. Solving (A.30) we have
zt = (G11 − G12N)tz0 (A.31)










where Zt = ztzT
t and V satisﬁes the Lyapunov equation
V = T + HTV H (A.33)
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minimizing Ω0 given by (A.32) with respect to the non-zero elements of D given z0 using
a standard numerical technique. An important feature of the result is that unlike the
previous solution the optimal value of D, D∗ say, is not independent of z0. That is to say
D∗ = D∗(z0)
A.4 The Stochastic Case

















where ut is an n × 1 vector of white noise disturbances independently distributed with
cov(ut) = Σ. Then, it can be shown that certainty equivalence applies to all the policy
rules apart from the simple rules (see Currie and Levine (1993)). The expected loss at
time t is as before with quadratic terms of the form zT
t Xzt = tr(Xzt,ZT

























where Et is the expectations operator with expectations formed at time t.
















































The optimized simple rule is found at time t = 0 by minimizing ΩSIM
0 given by (A.38).










or, in other words, the optimized rule depends both on the initial displacement z0 and on
the covariance matrix of disturbances Σ.
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The linearizations in the main text, especially that for the real wage equation, requires
us to express the price and wage-setting ﬁrst order conditions as stochastic non-linear


















C,t is the marginal utility of consumption.
Then we can write the ﬁrst order condition for optimal price-setting, (51) as
ΦtΞ = Λt (B.4)
where new variables Ξt and Λt are deﬁned by











(1 − 1/ζ)(1 − 1/η)(1 − Tt)
(B.6)
(B.7)
From our deﬁnitions (B.2) and (B.3), (52) can now be written as
1 = ξp˜ Π
ζ−1
t + (1 − ξp)Φ
1−ζ
t (B.8)
Five equations (B.2) to (B.8) in Πt, Φt, ˜ Πt, Ξt and Ωt now provide the dynamics of optimal
setting in a convenient form
Similarly we can carry out the same exercise for wage setting. We can now use
βkΛt+k(r) = Dt+k, obtained from (38), and Λt(r) =
MUC
t (r)
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Υt = Γt (B.11)






































C Welfare Quadratic Approximation for the Case of An Ap-
proximately Eﬃcient Steady State
We denote by Lt(r) the total labour supplied by household r and denote by Lt(f) the
index of diﬀerentiated labour employed by ﬁrm f. Deﬁning Lt(f,r) as the labour supplied






To clarify the exposition we ﬁrst consider the case without capital.
C.1 Labour The Only Factor














Since we assume complete risk-sharing within each bloc, we may regard each consumer
as being identical with every other. From the point of view of leisure, to obtain the
social welfare function, we need to sum over all workers. Before doing this, we obtain the



























31This is reason we choose the ratio form over the diﬀerence form.
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t ,DW
t ) and lnPt(r) ∼ N( P
t ,DP
t ), from subsection C.4 we
have that























dr ≃ 1 +
1
2
η(1 + φ)(1 + ηφ)DW
t (C.5)








































where for convenience we have written the log of the real wage relative to domestic pro-
ducer prices wrt = wt − pt, and πt is the inﬂation rate for domestic producer prices.
C.2 Labour, Capital and Fixed costs F
With capital and ﬁxed costs of production, the previous analysis changes to
Yt(f) = AtZα
t Kα





RK,t = Ψ′(Zt) (C.9)













K,t − F (C.10)
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η(1 + ηφ)(1 + φ)DW
t ) (C.13)
Note that  
Pt
Wt















which is obtained by substituting for Bt and Yt from (C.9), and then using the second


























We shall expand this about the eﬃcient steady state level described earlier, using the
resource constraints in Zt, Lt, Kt−1. We use proportional deviations for all variables,
denoted by the corresponding lower-case letters, so that for example ct = Ct−C
C .
Result: The ﬁrst order terms in this expansion are zero.













C1−σ(1 − h)−σ(1 − βh)ct − κN1+φlt
 
(C.16)




t−1 − F − Gt − It(1 − S(It/It−1)) − Ψ(Zt)Kt−1 (C.17)
which is a consequence of the fact that Kt−1(f)/Lt(f) is the same for all ﬁrms. From this
we can calculate ct, so recalling that Ψ(1) = 0, and ignoring for the moment the second-







C−σ(1 − h)−σ(1 − βh)
 
α(Y + F)zt + (1 − α)(Y + F)lt
+(α(Y + F) −
1
β
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(80).
It follows that the second-order terms in the Taylor-series approximation of the welfare
loss is given by the sum of two expressions: the second-order terms in ct, lt from (C.15),
and the second-order terms in zt, lt, kt−1 from the expansion of ct in (C.16). The former



















(1 − βξw)(1 − ξw)
(∆wrt + πt − γw(∆wrt−1 + πt−1))2
 
] (C.19)
where all the steady state values C,L,Y correspond to their eﬃcient values. Note that we
can replace κL1+φ in this expression by C1−σ(1−h)−σ(1−1/η)(1−α)/cy where cy = C
Y +F ,


















(1−βξw)(1−ξw)(∆wrt + πt − γw(∆wrt−1 + πt−1))2
 
] (C.20)















t + 2Ψ′(1)ztkt−1) − S′′(1)(it − it−1)2
 
Using the deﬁnition ψ = Ψ′(1)/Ψ′′(1), and the deterministic equilibrium conditions Ψ′(1) =
RK and α(Y + F) = RKK, this may be rewritten as
−
1−βh











− 2atlt − δK
Y +F S′′(1)(it − it−1)2
 
(C.21)
To summarise, the quadratic form of the welfare is given by the sum of (C.20) and (C.21).
A number of points are worthy of note:
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utility is negative deﬁnite only if S′′(1) < 0. In our assumption and estimate for this
parameter is positive, so the utility is not completely positive deﬁnite.
2. There are of course no second order contributions from ﬁrst order changes in Lt.
3. When there is no capital stock, habit, wage-stickiness and government spending we








(yt − ˆ yt)2 + wπ(πt − γpπt−1)2 
 
(C.22)
where ˆ yt =
1+φ
σ+φat is potential output achieved when prices are ﬂexible and
wπ =
ζξ
(1 − ξ)(1 − βξ)(σ + φ)
(C.23)
4. To work out the welfare in terms of a consumption equivalent percentage increase,
expanding U(C) =
C1−σ(1−h)1−σ
1−σ as a Taylor series, a 1% permanent increase in
consumption of 1 per cent yields a ﬁrst-order welfare increase (1 − h)1−σC−σ∆C =
(1 − hc)C1−σ(1 − h)−σ × 0.01. Since standard deviations are expressed in terms of
percentages, the welfare loss terms which are proportional to the covariance matrix
(and pre-multiplied by 1/2) are of order 10−4. Letting X be these losses reported
in the paper. Then ce = X
(1−h) × 0.01 as given in (90). The expressions in (91) are
derived using only the quadratic terms.
C.3 Derivation of (C.4) and (C.5)
It is convenient though not essential to assume a normal distribution with lnWt(r) ∼













Thus it follows that
 








from which we obtain (C.4). Similarly
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Figure 5: Price Inﬂation Rate Following a 1% Government Spending Shock














Figure 6: Output Gap Following a 1% Government Spending Shock
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Figure 7: Wage Inﬂation Rate Following a 1% Government Spending Shock















Figure 8: Interest Rate Following a 1% Government Spending Shock
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Figure 9: Price Inﬂation Rate Following a 1% Technology Shock



















Figure 10: Output Gap Following a 1% Technology Shock
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Figure 11: Wage Inﬂation Rate Following a 1% Technology Shock














Figure 12: Interest Rate Following a 1% Technology Shock
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